Gender Inequalities and Family Solidarity in Times of Crisis by Verbeke, Alain Laurent et al.
Intersentia 57
GENDER INEQUALITIES 
AND FAMILY SOLIDARITY 
IN TIMES OF CRISIS
Alain Laurent Verbeke, Elisabeth Alofs, 
Christine Defever and Dimitri Mortelmans
Besides sociological, demographic and cultural determinants, also 
economic conditions can induce a shift  in the social responsibilities of 
an individual, his family and society. Due to the current poor economic 
situation of most European countries, public funds are scarcer and 
the fi nancial sustainability of public safety nets for those in precarious 
situations is at risk. Th at is why the fi nancial crisis, topic of this book, has 
raised questions about which risks should still be covered by society and 
which risks could be covered via solidarity in private relationships and 
family law. Focusing on the socio-economic situation of women as one of 
the vulnerable groups, this chapter tackles the question whether a shift 
from public to private law protection can provide a solution for the limited 
public funds in times of economic crisis.
It is without doubt essential to our modern western society and identity, 
ever since the emancipation movements in the 20th century, that men and 
women are of equal value. Th is core value has been embedded in numerous 
legal documents, national legislation and international treaties.1 Today’s 
society however demonstrates some hypocrisy on two counts.
First of all, there are foreign cultures where women do not enjoy an 
equal legal position as men do and are not entitled to equal opportunities 
in education, work, career, leisure time, etc. Nevertheless many European 
countries have accepted in their midst the existence and fl ourishing of such 
cultures that fundamentally and conceptually discriminate against women. 
Th e mere fact that we accept such views to co-exist in our society, oft en 
for reasons of political correctness, is a denial of the very essence and core 
values of our culture and identity. Multiculturalism and integration cannot 
be achieved if we fail to claim respect for essential values such as the equal 
treatment of men and women. How respectful can the European culture 
be when it is too shy or cowardly to fi ght for one of its most fundamental 
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values? Respect for women starts with banning all rules and practices of 
female discrimination on our territory.
Secondly, although in our own western culture legal equality between 
men and women has been promoted as essential, western societies fail 
to operationalise that value in everyday life. In the fi rst section of this 
chapter  (1), sociological data are presented that demonstrate that de facto 
equality has not been achieved. For biological, social, psychological, 
traditional and other reasons, in day-to-day reality women continue to 
be ‘second class citizens’. Th e ‘glass ceiling’ is a permanent challenge 
for women, on the labour market, in boards and in politics. Even more 
staggering is the weak position of women in their most intimate context: 
the relationship with their life partner. Th is precarious situation of women 
particularly causes problems when the relationship is disrupted by divorce 
or break-up, which is the case in more than fi ft y percent of relationships. 
Th e data demonstrate that the socio-economic position aft er a break-up 
is far more disadvantageous for women compared to their former male 
partners.
Notwithstanding those data, the law and particularly family law 
erroneously starts from the premise of equality between the sexes. Th is 
dogma of formal equality, together with emancipatory ideas, has led to 
the de-institutionalisation, individualisation and liberalisation of family 
law over the past decades. As will be described in the second section of 
this chapter (2), these trends have led to the abolishment of fi nancial 
responsibilities within the family and to a lack of solidarity within family 
law. As mentioned before, this lack of solidarity mainly causes a problem 
when the family is disrupted by divorce or relationship break-up.
Given the persisting disparities between men and women in everyday 
life, the absence of responsibilities and solidarity in family law is 
questionable. Couldn’t, or indeed shouldn’t, family law pursue a protective 
role, which aims at compensating the actual diff erences between men and 
women which all too oft en lead to individual poverty, especially for women? 
As mentioned above, this question is even more urgent in times of economic 
crisis, as the sustainability of public safety nets is being queried. In the third 
section of this chapter (3), we therefore argue in favour of a more inclusive 
and equitable family law which recognises the existing diff erences between 
individuals, particularly between men and women. We aim to create a 
family law that tackles and adjusts the pernicious consequences of these 
inequalities.
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1. GENDERED SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
Th e increased standard living conditions in nearly all western societies 
aft er World War II resulted in an enormous increase of female participation 
in the labour market. As a consequence, the dominant model of the male 
breadwinner of the fi ft ies and sixties was slowly replaced by the dual-
earner family, which became the standard for contemporary families.2 
Yet the relative dominance of these dual-earner families cannot conceal 
the fundamental gender disparities in paid labour and care within these 
households.
Th is fi rst section starts with an overview of the socio-economic 
inequalities between men and women on the labour market and in the 
household (1.1). Next, we will look at the consequences of these inequalities 
when the family is disrupted by divorce or relationship break-up (1.2). We 
will see that the socio-economic position before and aft er a break-up is far 
more disadvantageous for women compared to the male partners.
1.1. SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES BETWEEN MEN 
AND WOMEN
In this section an overview of the labour force participation (1.1.1), wage 
and position (1.1.2) and career (1.1.3) inequalities between men and 
women will be presented. Subsequently, we will look at their position and 
responsibilities in the family and tackle imbalances in the division of 
household tasks and care between men and women (1.1.4).
1.1.1. Inequality in labour force participation
In general, women are less active on the labour market. Table 1 shows 
the percentage of women and men aged 15–64 years in Belgium who are 
working. Th e diff erence in employment rate between men and women 
has decreased over the years but still remains substantial. In 2012, almost 
67% of men (aged 15–64 years) were working, compared to merely 57% of 
women.
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Table 1. Evolution of employment rate in Belgium, by gender, 2000–2012, in %
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Men 69.3 68.8 68.3 67.3 67.9 68.3 67.9 68.7 68.6 67.2 67.4 67.1 66.9
Women 50.8 51.0 51.4 51.8 52.6 53.8 54.0 55.3 56.2 56.0 56.5 56.7 56.8
Source: ADSEI, Labour Force survey.
More striking are the gender disparities when looking at the part-time 
employment rate (table 2). Although part-time working has increased 
considerably over the past decade, there continues to be a major diff erence 
between women and men. In 2012, 43.5% of the women who were active on 
the labour market worked part-time. In the case of men, this was only 9%.
Table 2. Evolution of part-time employment rate in Belgium, by gender, 
2000–2012, in %
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Men 4.3 4.7 5.1 5.8 6.3 7.1 7.0 7.1 7.5 8.2 8.4 9.2 9.0
Women 34.9 35.8 36.4 38.0 39.3 40.4 41.0 40.5 40.8 41.4 42.1 43.3 43.5
Source: ADSEI, Labour Force survey.
Apart from the plain percentages, there is also a major diff erence in the 
reasons why people work part-time. An analysis of a Belgian sample from 
the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) conducted in 2005,3 
shows that only a small minority (1%) of men working less than 30 hours a 
week, mention household tasks or care as a reason to work part-time. Th is 
percentage is considerably higher among part-time working women (30%).
1.1.2. Inequality in wage and position
On average in 2013, a woman earned 10% less than a man per hour worked. 
Due to a large share of part-time working women, the pay gap rises to 23% 
on an annual basis. Th is raw gender pay gap can be attributed to a number 
of external factors. Only 26% of the gap is due to individual characteristics 
of the worker such as education, work experience, and years of service in 
the company. A dominant part of the gap can be brought back to gender 
segregation on the labour market (52% of the explained part of the gender 
pay gap).4 Women turn out to be over-represented in sectors, professions 
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and positions that pay less well. To a large extent, unequal pay is a question 
of unequal work.
Indeed, within the labour market diff erences between ‘female’ and 
‘male’ professions and industries can be observed. So-called ‘female’ 
professions are systematically less well-paid in comparison with ‘male’ 
professions and industries. A major explanation for this diff erence lies in 
the perception society has of certain professions. Being a construction 
worker, for example, is considered as being a ‘tough profession’ meriting 
a higher wage. A geriatric assistant on the other hand is not considered 
to have a ‘heavy profession’ and therefore tends to be paid considerably 
less. Industries with higher-ranked positions are frequently more male-
dominated than industries that are perceived to be lower (or ‘soft er’). Studies 
have shown that the gender segregation on the labour market already starts 
when adolescents make subject choices in secondary school. Girls select 
themselves into lower-ranked sectors with worse payment and status.5
In addition, compared to men, the share of women in higher positions on 
the Flemish labour market is signifi cantly lower than their overall share on 
the labour market.6 Not only are there fewer women in executive positions, 
their relative share according to positions in the labour market also decreases 
along the corporate ladder. Baerts et al.7 conclude from a large collection 
of studies that leading positions and promotions are far less reserved for 
women than for men. Women face the so-called ‘glass ceiling’ preventing 
them from achieving higher positions on the labour market, despite their 
abilities. Looking at the Belgian fi gures for 2010, only 34.1% of executive and 
higher management positions are occupied by women (ADSEI).
Not only are the positions on the labour market gendered, women also 
face inequalities within a similar position. Within the same profession, 
women have less extra-legal advantages, cost deductions, daily allowances, 
bonuses or double holiday allowance. Men also receive more fl exible wage 
arrangements or sickness and hospitalisation insurance.8
1.1.3. Inequalities during career
As shown above, women do more part-time work than men. But during 
their life, they also use career breaks (maternity leave, time credit) more 
oft en. More than 66% of people taking a career break are women. Th is 
hegemony of women becomes even more apparent for full-time breaks and 
thematic leaves, such as parental leave, leave for medical assistance or leave 
for palliative care (respectively 77% and 72%). Th is percentage is lower for 
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part-time breaks (63%), where part-time options are gradually fi nding their 
way to men.9 Th e household and specifi cally the care of (young) children 
is the predominant motivation for these career decisions among women.10 
For men, ending their career in a part-time schedule is clearly the most 
dominant reason. Alternatively, more men use their time out to try a new 
job or to start their own business.11
Th e only reversed gender gap is found in research on the wage penalty of 
career breaks. In general, wage diff erentials between men with and without 
a break are much higher than between women with and without a break.12 
Men experience a larger drop in income aft er returning from a career break 
compared to women.13 In addition, wage growth for men is slower aft er 
they return from an interruption. In other words, the penalty for a career 
break in terms of wages is higher for men.
Apart from career breaks, women show greater variability and less 
stability in their careers, oft en resulting in more vulnerable positions. 
Entry into the labour market is oft en more diffi  cult for women, causing a 
longer unemployment period before fi nding their fi rst full-time position. 
Th ey also switch more oft en between part-time and full-time jobs (oft en 
between diff erent jobs). Men, on the other hand, have careers that show less 
variability and that are more stable and traditional, characterised by full-
time jobs and easy job market entries.14
1.1.4. Inequalities within the household
Th e inequality on the labour market and in career paths fi nds its origin in 
the traditional division of labour in households. Diff erent studies fi nd that 
even when women work an equal share in the labour market, they still are 
confronted with a larger share of the responsibilities at home.15 In addition, 
part-time working women have a higher chance of being responsible for a 
dominant share of the household work, while the opposite is not true for 
households with part-time working men.16
Th e division of household work in families with children is even more 
unequal compared to childless households.17 Time-use research shows that, 
in a week, men spend seven hours more time on paid labour than women. 
Women spend eight hours and 35 minutes more on household work and 
an additional one hour and 35 minutes more on parenting and care for the 
children. In sum, the weekly work load of women in the household is three 
hours higher than that of men.18 In general, young, highly educated men 
with higher professional positions participate more in the household work. 
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Married men and men who work longer hours in paid labour help less. Th e 
most equal division of household work can be found in childless households 
where both partners work and where the woman has a signifi cant share in 
the household income, and where both partners have a positive attitude 
towards equal gender roles.19
When families choose to decrease the working hours of one of the 
parents, women are usually the ones who step forward as it is predominantly 
women who face the dilemma of combining work and family life.20 Indeed, 
the labour market participation of a family with children is 6.4% lower 
compared to a household without children. Th is diff erence is completely due 
to a reduction in working hours for women. A majority of working women 
decrease their activity aft er the birth of their fi rst child. Th is reduction in 
working hours is a rarity among new fathers.21
Th is is not a value-free choice. Th e choice is inspired by traditional 
gender roles and societal expectations of the position of men and women 
in a family.22 Even among women themselves, the idea exists that it is the 
responsibility of women to take care of (young) children. It is a societal 
legitimation to reserve the caring role for women. Th ere are signs that the 
classic breadwinner model is fading or at least revealing its pitfalls23 but 
research from the Panel Study of Belgian Households shows that breaking 
the ruling social conventions is only marginally present among families.24 
Moreover, these decisions are not only value-driven. Another important 
incentive to tip the balance towards women is the wages of the partners.25 
Th e one earning less income has less bargaining power in the couple. Th e 
loss of income by reducing one’s working hours is less for the one with the 
lowest income. Referring to the discussion of the gendered labour market 
above, men have higher positions and higher wages than their partners, 
even though the educational level of women has risen enormously.
1.2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES BETWEEN MEN 
AND WOMEN AFTER A RELATIONSHIP BREAK-UP
Th e previous section showed huge gender diff erences in caring for children. As 
a consequence, women are less active on the labour market. Th ey work more 
part-time and less in managerial roles. Women are working in less well-paid 
industries and interrupt their career more oft en to combine work and family 
life. Th e result is that they have less social and economic capital and during the 
course of their life they accumulate fewer pensions rights than their partners.
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Th e issue of these inequalities becomes apparent when the relationship 
ends in a divorce or a break-up. In this section, the consequences of 
relationship and labour market inequalities aft er the dissolution of the 
relationship will be analysed. Many fi ndings show that women, again, are 
most disadvantaged, particularly when they end up as a single mother.
1.2.1. Inequalities in the division of care
A longitudinal study on register data revealed that the odds that women 
ultimately become the head of a single-parent household are four times 
higher than the odds for men. Other data shows that 13.1% of fathers 
head single-father households one year aft er the break-up while 50.6% 
of divorced men are single without children one year aft er. Th e opposite 
is true for women: single-mother households are found in 54.8% of cases 
while only 10.4% of women are single with no children aft er the break-up. 
Th erefore, women with children prior to divorce have a much higher chance 
of becoming a single parent.26
Not only do women have a higher chance of heading a single-parent 
household, they also stay longer in this type of household. It is found that 
73.1% of the women who were single mothers at the end of the fi rst year 
aft er divorce are still in this position one year later. For single fathers, this is 
only 62.9%. Four years aft er divorce the single mother percentage drops to 
45.9% (31.4% for single fathers).27
Moreover, women also have more children in their household compared 
to single fathers (mean of 1.3 children for women vs. 0.4 children among 
men). In addition, the age of the children is lower when they live with their 
mother (mean age of the youngest child is 9.5 years compared to 14 years 
when living with the father).28
1.2.2. Inequalities in the fi nancial consequences
Diff erent longitudinal studies have shown that the fi nancial situation of 
men is relatively stable or even improves aft er relationship break-up. For 
women, the evolution shows a negative trend in all studies. Th eir situation 
aft er a break-up only improves at a slow pace, taking a considerable 
number of years to overcome the fi nancial consequences of divorce. Based 
on the Belgian Panel data from 1992 to 2002, men would see their OECD 
equivalised income (i.e. household income that takes into account the 
size of the household, and the number and age of children to allow for 
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comparison over diff erent household types) increase by almost 5%. Women, 
on the other hand, face a decrease in equivalised income of 18.8%. When 
faced with a loss in income, it takes at least fi ve years for 45% of women to 
reach their pre-divorce income level.29
Th e evolution of income is determined by many factors. Th e height of 
the pre-divorce income determines the drop in income aft erwards.30 In 
addition, the relative contribution of the partners to the household income 
before the divorce is important for the post-divorce trajectory. When there 
are inequalities during the marriage, the fi nancial consequences show 
one clear winner and one loser. Since men oft en earn a larger share of the 
household income, the drop in income for women is usually much greater. 
Suddenly, women need to run a household without the (higher) income of 
the partner. For a man, being a single breadwinner in a household, a divorce 
implies a fi nancial gain. Th e more hours he works, the bigger the gain.31
When children are involved, the custody arrangements determine 
to a large extent the fi nancial consequences for the parents. Th e parent 
residing with the children is fi nancially worse off . In particular, a higher 
total number of children and more young children increase the fi nancial 
disadvantage. More children and younger children are factors that will 
have already infl uenced pre-divorce income (being lower) but the eff ect 
continues to be negative aft er the break-up. Having children has an eff ect on 
the family income of about 9% compared to households without children. 
Additionally, the wage gap increases by about 50%.
Re-partnering is held out as a successful strategy for women to 
counterbalance the negative fi nancial consequences. For men, fi nding a new 
partner is shown to be less successful. One explanation for this diff erence 
is the labour market position of the new partners. Th e wage gap turns out 
to be negative for women. When a woman re-partners, the odds are higher 
that this will be accompanied by an increase in her total household income. 
For men, the odds are greater that a lower-earning partner will be found, 
which leads to a decrease in his total income.32
Th e results from panel data were recently confi rmed by a large-scale 
study on register data:33 the fi nancial drawback is biggest among women 
heading single-parent households aft er divorce. Th is is illustrated in fi gure 
1. Stressing the fi nancial consequences for women, we should not forget 
that there are also a considerable number of men who undergo a dramatic 
fi nancial decline aft er divorce. Moreover, the subjective experience can also 
diff er between divorcees. Transfers from one partner to the other ex-partner 
can trigger a more negative impression of the actual fi nancial evolution.34 
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One situation where this happens is when one partner is supposed to pay 
child support for the children or alimony to the ex-partner. Th e Belgian 
divorce law of 2007 restricts the duration of alimony payment (maximally 
to the duration of the broken marriage).35 As a consequence, the most 
vulnerable group – mothers with young children from a short marriage – 
are allowed the least amount of alimony. Th e child support payments are 
freed from a time constraint. In literature, there is a disagreement about 
whether or not alimony and child support payments help people stay out 
of poverty.36 A crucial question is also whether or not child support and 
alimony are actually paid (or can be paid).37 Paying alimony seems to be 
closely related to the degree of initiative in breaking up the relationship and 
the degree of contact with the children aft erwards.38 Th erefore, a positive 
eff ect of shared co-residence in the correct payment of transfers between 
former partners could be expected.
Figur e 1. Evolution of the total gross yearly household (OECD and infl ation 
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Source: Data warehouse ‘Labour market and social protection’ – Crossroads Bank Social 
Security, own calculations.
2. ABSENCE OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND 
SOLIDARITY IN FAMILY LAW
Th e law, particularly family law, is dogmatically premised on the equality 
between men and women despite the existence within today’s society 
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of undeniable gender diff erences. Because of this ‘formal’ equality, and 
together with the emancipation of women, family law has been subjected to 
trends promoting the individual. Th e disappearance of responsibilities and 
solidarity in family law is particularly noticeable in the form and content 
of intimate relationships (2.1), in the limited protection of the weaker 
spouse, oft en the wife, aft er divorce (2.2) and in the limited, almost absent, 
protection of unmarried partners, in particular when their relationship 
breaks down (2.3).
2.1. FORMAT OF INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS
Last century’s emancipation of women has radically impacted the form and 
content of intimate relationships.
First, over the course of the last century, marriage has been transformed 
from a strategic alliance for family power and property interests into a 
private bond of love between two individuals who want to share their 
lives together. Whereas previously emphasis lay on the societal roles that 
marriage fulfi lled – to wit, procreation, raising children, provision of 
material security to the family, protection of family property39 – marriage 
is now seen as a private agreement based on love. And this ‘agreement’ must 
be able to be dissolved when such love ends.40 Th is concept of marriage 
seems to return to some of the basic principles of the French Revolution, 
when the law relating to marriage was also based on aff ection, love and 
autonomy rather than on legal obligations and coercion.41 Th is change in 
the concept of marriage is characterised by a strong orientation toward 
self-determination and by an individual pursuit of satisfaction and inner 
harmony.42 Th is ‘de-institutionalisation’ of marriage goes hand in hand 
with a liberalisation and contractualisation of the law of divorce. Th ose 
defending marriage as an unassailable institution43 have had to concede to 
those defending marriage as a revocable contract.44
Secondly, over the course of the last two decades, marriage has rapidly 
lost its monopoly as the only possible format for a durable relationship. 
Secularisation brought the acceptance of many other models to organise 
one’s love life. Unmarried cohabitation has become the norm in many 
societies. At some points legislators intervened and off ered a model of legally 
organised unmarried cohabitation. Oft en this was an answer to the demands 
of same-sex couples. Fortunately in many European jurisdictions same-sex 
couples now enjoy a fully equal treatment and can also choose to marry.45
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Autonomy and the freedom of choice have become the credo for many 
couples in organising their intimate relationships. However, this claim for 
autonomy may come with severe inconveniences in case of break-up, at least 
for the weaker party, who is usually the woman, as shown in section 1.
2.2. NO EFFECTIVE PROTECTION FOR MARRIED 
WOMEN UPON DIVORCE
Th e liberalisation of divorce law has reinforced the fragility of marriage. 
Love as the binding factor between spouses has led to less sustainable 
marriages than those based on property and social objectives.46 Th e 
liberalisation of divorce law and the introduction of a ‘right to divorce’ in 
many European jurisdictions have increased the instability of marriage. 
Th is has led to the arrival of a new social risk, connected with the vulnerable 
family situation of a person.47 Th e freedom to choose – in this case whether 
or not to remain married – creates today’s divorce risk.48
In most continental jurisdictions, matrimonial property law does 
not off er any protection for the weaker party upon divorce. Although 
the default system (the legal regime) in principle off ers some protection 
and solidarity (e.g. community property or compensation mechanisms), 
spouses may contract out of this regime. Th ey can do this by concluding a 
pre- or post-marital contract, such as a contract of separation of property. 
Here, the title (property) principle rules in its full glory. Each spouse owns 
the assets in his or her name, or his or her share in the joint assets. An 
entitlement to maintenance still exists for the weaker party upon divorce, 
when matrimonial property law fails to create a reasonable protection, but 
this entitlement was oft en reduced in time or in extent by the latest divorce 
reforms (e.g. the Belgian divorce reform in 2007).
Although this freedom of choice, the contractualisation of matrimonial 
property law and the right to divorce may nicely fi t our modern society’s 
need for autonomy of both spouses, acting as independent and free 
individuals, it does ignore the consequences of day-to-day reality of how 
many couples and households are organised. Although the freedom of 
choice argument is gender-neutral and applies to men and women, social 
reality teaches us that there is a greater risk of women being treated 
unfairly. Whatever one’s moral opinion may be, one cannot deny aft er 
considering the data shown in section 1 that many couples do make a choice 
that allows the husband to fully invest in his professional career and that 
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does not allow the wife, in order to combine with children and household, 
to realise her full career potential.49 She rather seeks a balance with family 
tasks. She then chooses another less demanding career (also less rewarding 
fi nancially), or a nine-to-fi ve job, a part-time job, a temporary career break, 
etc. Th e situation of women nowadays is oft en much more complex than in 
the old black and white days of housewives without any activity whatsoever 
on the job market. Today women juggle to keep all the balls in the air 
simultaneously. And very oft en it is the woman who reduces her career 
ambitions, picking a less demanding job and hence not fully realising her 
potential. Not surprisingly marriage for a professionally active woman in 
today’s society has been qualifi ed as a Doppelbelastungsehe.50 She bears 
twice the burden, both at home and at her job.51 In addition to all of this, it 
seems to be common for women to spend their income on consumer goods 
while men tend to invest.52
Th e choices women make in balancing work and family may be perfectly 
valid and sound during the marriage, in order for the couple and the family 
unit to fi nd its private equilibrium, optimise their joint venture and realise 
their common dreams. A family policy that allows partners to agree on the 
division between income-generating labour on the one hand and care for 
the household and the children on the other can therefore be approved.53 If 
the most necessary or effi  cient division of tasks would be to allow one type 
of task to be undertaken solely or mostly by one of the spouses, such a choice 
must be possible. Although economic independence may be stimulated by 
government, it need not be. Aft er all, there are limits to the outsourcing 
of caring activities (the so-called marketisation of care) and parents oft en 
cherish a deserved desire to provide some of that care themselves.
Such choices may however come with devastating consequences upon 
divorce, resulting in one of the spouses receiving all of the assets and benefi ts 
and the other spouse being sent away with virtually no assets and the loss of 
a career and earning capacity.54 In corporate law, regarding the relationship 
between business partners, many jurisdictions know the forbidden societas 
leonina where one partner takes all the profi ts and the other one just the 
losses. However, when the partners are not business partners (corporate law) 
but lovers (family law), this fundamental principle does not apply.
Given the adverse risks linked to a divorce, the introduction of a ‘right 
to divorce’ must not lead to the removal of responsibilities between spouses. 
On the contrary, it can be argued that the existence of a ‘right to divorce’ 
and an effi  cient and fl exible divorce procedure justify a strengthened post-
marriage solidarity. Whatever the decision of the spouses about the division 
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of labour during the marriage, the consequences thereof must be borne by 
both when the marriage ends.55 Aft er the dissolution of the marriage the 
economic self-reliance of each spouse will once again be the starting point, 
but this does not prevent the division of the economic advantages and 
disadvantages resulting from the division of tasks during marriage. When 
the income of the former spouses is insuffi  cient, an appeal can be made 
to communal solidarity in the form of social security or social support. 
Communal solidarity must nonetheless remain subsidiary to the solidarity 
between the former spouses within private law to compensate the economic 
inequalities caused by the relationship break-up.56
In Anglo-American jurisdictions this unfair situation is corrected through 
imperative law. Th e tradition of strict title (property) principle has been 
mitigated, as early as in the seventies of last century, by devices of equitable 
distribution of all sorts.57 Th e judge can decide according to equity, as he 
thinks fi t, to reallocate property and ignore title of assets. Moreover the judge 
must take into account a long list of statutory factors to justify such decision.58 
Although the weaker or poorer spouse does not enjoy a vested or secure 
entitlement but merely a possibility to participate in the marital wealth, the 
evolution in most US jurisdictions is towards a presumption of a 50/50 sharing 
of the marital gains.59 And in England the recent case law of the House of 
Lords also points in this direction.60 Continental legal systems as well seem to 
need a similar hard core protection through imperative legal provisions.
2.3. NO PROTECTION FOR UNMARRIED 
COHABITANTS
Another major fl aw of traditional family law is that it does not take enough 
into account the social reality that many people live together unmarried.
In some jurisdictions unmarried cohabitants may register and enjoy 
a treatment similar to marriage. In other jurisdictions a semi-system 
exists. Th is is the case in Belgium with the rather peculiar system of legal 
cohabitation (articles 1475–1479 of the Belgian Civil Code), off ering a 
limited set of rules.
Quite a number of unmarried partners live together in a de facto 
cohabitation that is not offi  cially registered (although they may be 
domiciled at the same address and therefore enjoy several fi scal and social 
security benefi ts). For them no solidarity protection whatsoever is available. 
Matrimonial property law and inheritance law do not apply. All couples 
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who have an intimate conjugal relationship, but decided not to enter into 
marriage are subject to the common rules of contract and property, and 
contractual freedom. It is quite easy to picture the situation of the wife in 
the break-up of a seventeen-year cohabitation with three children. As to the 
property aspects, the strict separation of property rule applies, with all the 
consequences as described above. Very oft en, even a right to maintenance 
or alimony is not available.
3. CREATING A FAIR FAMILY LAW
Taking into account the established gender inequalities, the question arises 
whether there is justifi cation to de-institutionalise and remove solidarity 
from family law as has been done over the past decades. Couldn’t, or indeed 
shouldn’t, family law pursue a protective role, based on compensating for 
the actual socio-economic diff erences between man and wife which all too 
oft en give rise to endangered livelihoods and individual poverty aft er the 
break-up of the relationship? As already mentioned, the necessity of private 
solidarity is a hot topic in times of crisis when public fi nances are scarce and 
the fi nancial sustainability of public safety nets is called into question. In 
the following section, fi rst we debunk the arguments which underlie liberal 
family law, namely the autonomy of will and the freedom of choice. Th en 
we make a number of suggestions to come to a more solidarity based and 
fair family law; a family law that takes the existing gender inequalities as its 
starting point and strives to reduce the pernicious fi nancial consequences 
that these inequalities lead to.
3.1. FALLACY OF AUTONOMY AND CHOICE61
Th e factual situations of married couples under strict separation of property 
(in jurisdictions without imperative corrections), and of unmarried 
cohabitants without a contractual arrangement establishing property 
solidarity, are very similar in the event of the break-up of the relationship. For 
many, scholars and courts alike, the situation of spouses under separation of 
property or unmarried partners does not present a case for discrimination, 
since they supposedly have opted for this regime and not for the system of 
marriage or the legal regime in marriage with its focus on solidarity and all 
its protective rules.62 It is a free and deliberate choice, so goes the argument. 
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So please accept the consequences of your choice. Do not claim rules you did 
not opt for. And certainly do not complain about discrimination.
In the following section, these arguments will be refuted. First we will 
consider the situation of the unmarried cohabitants (3.1.1) and then expand 
the analysis to those married under separation of property (3.1.2).
3.1.1. Unfairness for the weaker partner in unmarried cohabitation
Th e unmarried couple has made a choice not to be bound to each other. Th e 
choice was made not to be protected, to remain free. Th ey had the choice 
to opt into the protective format of marriage. Yet they freely decided not to 
do so. Th erefore, they should not get such protection. Th e general principles 
of the common law of contracts and property should be applied. Th is was 
their choice. Not applying specifi c principles of matrimonial property law, 
alimony law and inheritance law is the evident consequence of that choice. 
Hence this cannot be discriminative, as it is commonly said.63
Th is emphasis and rather formal focus on marriage may surprise. 
Indeed, it has been argued that in most international human rights 
instruments, it is not so much marriage as an institution that is protected 
but rather the family as the basic unit of society.64 In Australia the 
consequences of a relationship are not based on the ceremony of marriage 
but rather on the relationship of interdependence between the parties65 (see 
also the concept of the ‘common law marriage’). Both elements invalidate 
the traditional choice argument: choice for marriage as such is not relevant 
and choice in itself is not an adequate frame because of the interdependence 
between the parties. We will formulate some arguments why the autonomy 
and choice argument in the context of marriage and matrimonial contracts 
is an inadequate and even erroneous frame.
3.1.1.1. No fully and adequately informed consent
First of all, for a choice to be binding in its legal consequences, it should 
be made with fully informed consent. It is very doubtful that married 
people have clear and sound knowledge about most legal regulations that 
govern the marriage. It is equally doubtful that unmarried couples would 
have explicit knowledge about the absence of such regulations in their case. 
It is naïve and unrealistic to assume that unmarried partners and spouses 
have a decent grasp of all of the legal consequences of living together or 
marrying.66
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In a case of the Canadian Supreme Court, Justice L’Heureux Dubé put it 
elegantly in her dissenting opinion:
‘Most people are not lawyers. Th ey are oft en not aware of the state of the law. 
Worse, many maintain positive misconceptions as to what obligations and 
rights exist in association with marriage and other relationships.’67
‘Th e fact that marriage gives rise to legal obligations does not, by itself, 
signal that the source of those obligations is a bargained-for exchange or the 
product of a consensus. While the price of a haircut is known in advance and 
can be contracted for (with a higher price for perms than for brushcuts), the 
same cannot be said about marriage.’68
‘If I am incorrect in concluding that the source of the obligations in the 
MPA (Matrimonial Property Act of Nova Scotia) is not based on the choice of 
marriage, it does not follow that heterosexual unmarried cohabitants enter into 
their relationships specifi cally to avoid those legal obligations. In other words, the 
choice argument fails from both sides: many unmarried partners do not choose to 
cohabit or remain unmarried so as to avoid the legal consequences of marriage.’69
It therefore remains to be seen and proven that spouses and partners have 
made one or the other choice with an informed consent that is suffi  cient to 
qualify for a binding contract and to be bound by all of its consequences.
3.1.1.2. ‘Will-defi ciency’ in love
Secondly, even with such full and complete information, one can doubt 
whether in fact a free and autonomous choice has been made at all. Th is is 
the point of interdependence of the parties as mentioned earlier. Picture the 
woman who has been informed of all the legal consequences and aft er four 
years of living together with a man and having his child, kindly asks him 
to marry her. Th e man however does not like the idea. He does not like the 
formalities. It is an old-fashioned establishment relic. And, ‘honey, we don’t 
need this. Our love is all that matters’. What can this woman do? It takes 
two to marry. So she cannot make the choice for marriage if he does not join 
her in that choice. Th erefore she did not make the choice to avoid marriage, 
and she cannot be held liable for the choice which she did not make.
Th e counterargument could be that the woman eff ectively did make such 
choice not to marry, because she decided to stay in the relationship. It is her 
autonomy and decision to stay in the relationship or to leave. It is true that 
a rational actor could argue that given the wish of the woman to marry, the 
moment the man refuses to fulfi l this wish, she should leave the relationship. 
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Since she did not decide to do so, one could argue that she has deliberately 
joined the choice of the man, which was not to marry. Th erefore she also 
made the choice not to marry, and is bound by its legal consequences.
Here the reply might be that the choice to stay in the relationship and 
therefore not to marry, is not a free and autonomous choice. Given the 
intimate conjugal relationship and the fact that the woman loves the man, 
she has not made a free and deliberate choice. Her consent to that particular 
choice is ‘poisoned’, ‘contaminated’ or ‘hindered’ by her love. Maybe we 
should introduce a new will-defi ciency in love and romance in concluding 
valid contracts.70
Furthermore, her choice may also have been infl uenced by the presence 
of the child they have together. Would it not be in the interest of the child 
that its parents stay together as a couple? So the autonomy and will of the 
woman may have been impacted by the child’s interest and fate. Her free 
will is defi cient as is the case when a contract is made by mistake or under 
duress such as threat or force.71 Th erefore, she did not make the free choice 
not to marry and cannot be bound by the legal consequences of such choice 
not made.
3.1.1.3. Not words but behaviour and actions count
How can we reconcile this with the perspective of the man? On his side, one 
can argue that he did make a free choice not to marry. Suppose he knew 
very well what he was doing. He was fully informed on all the legal ins and 
outs and the consequences of marriage, legal cohabitation and de facto 
cohabitation. Based on this information he made up his mind and with 
informed consent he decided the best choice was not to marry. He made 
a choice in favour of freedom, not being bound, being able to escape and 
getting out whenever he wishes to, with as low and cheap consequences as 
possible. Th erefore his choice should be respected and legal consequences 
that are not those of his choice should not be imposed on him. Th is sounds 
like a strong argument, does it not?
Not really. It is correct that he may have said: ‘I want freedom. I do not 
want to marry. I want to be able to end this relationship whenever I wish 
with no strings attached and with no responsibilities or liabilities’. And his 
actions may have been in line with his words in the very fi rst months or even 
years of the relationship. However, at some point in time, his words have 
been overruled by his actions and behaviour.72 Th e longer he stays in the 
relationship, the more he commits to the common project, dreams, hopes 
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and lives together, the more his behaviour is inconsistent with his words. 
At some point, he reaches a tipping point: a point where his behaviour is so 
clearly and explicitly in contradiction with the words he once pronounced, 
that he cannot return to the freedom of his words anymore.
3.1.1.4. Point of no return
Th ere is a wide margin of discretion and appreciation to defi ne this tipping 
point of no return. It can be a multitude of elements, such as three years 
of living together, or having a child together, or the fact that a substantial 
contribution is made by one or by both partners to the relationship or in the 
sole interest of the other partner.73 Th e concrete determination or defi ning 
criteria of the point of no return must be made in specifi c legislation. It will 
depend on the political process and it is an arbitrary choice. Hereaft er we 
refer to unmarried cohabitation that has reached the point of no return 
according to a set of legal criteria to be agreed upon, as durable cohabitation 
or conjugal cohabitation.
What is not arbitrary but certain is that the point of no return is out 
there. We may debate its conditions, but not the principle itself. And 
once it is reached, there is no way back. Once the man has said A, but is 
overwhelmingly doing B, he should not be held to the consequences of 
A, but to the consequences of B.74 Th is does not contradict his choice. 
For it is his behaviour and his own pattern of actions that constitute his 
choice. It is the choice of actions, the choice of life, which determines his 
responsibilities, not the choice pronounced in cheap words, one day, a long 
time ago.
From this point of no return, a protective format similar to the one 
of marriage and the legal regime with its focus on solidarity and all its 
protective rules (namely principles of matrimonial property law, alimony 
law and inheritance law) must be applied. Consequently the harsh principles 
of the common law of contracts and property will be corrected through 
imperative rules with a protective role.
3.1.2. Unfairness of matrimonial contracts of strict separation of property
At the moment of conclusion of the matrimonial contract, oft en a pre-
nuptial agreement, both spouses agree on the words of a contract for full 
autonomy and independence. Upon divorce, even aft er fi ft een or twenty 
years of marriage and two or three children, the property relationship 
Alain Laurent Verbeke, Elisabeth Alofs, Christine Defever 
and Dimitri Mortelmans
76 Intersentia
between the spouses is governed by these strict words. Th e inequities and 
unfairness of the title principle, leaving the vast majority of the assets to the 
husband, do not seem to overrule, for Belgian and many continental courts, 
the words of the original contract. Th e situation is very diff erent from the 
Anglo-American approach.
Th e defenders of contractual autonomy and legal certainty produce 
again the choice argument. Both spouses made a choice for separation of 
property and they should respect it.
It is striking to observe such vigorous defence of contractual autonomy 
while in other areas of law, such as labour law or consumer law, numerous 
imperative rules protecting the weaker parties allow the overruling 
of contractual arrangements.75 It is diffi  cult to understand why the 
development of contract law for consumers into a protective format whereby 
a signed contract may even be revoked unilaterally within a fi xed period, 
would not be equally applicable in long term contracts between intimate 
partners. For the advocates of contractual autonomy, apparently employees 
and consumers deserve more protection than spouses.
3.1.2.1. Fully and adequately informed consent
Th e choice fallacy claims that the spouses were fully informed, by the 
notary, about the consequences and risks of the separation of property. 
With that knowledge they made the choice for that contract and now, upon 
divorce, they must just live by the consequences of that choice and accept 
them.
We can challenge this choice dictate with the same arguments as above. 
Even with full information about the legal rules, did they really understand 
the concrete consequences of all these rules? Could they imagine the 
impact of the arrival of children and the ensuing eff ect on the organisation 
model, responsibilities and task divisions in the family? As for all long term 
contracts, it is diffi  cult to predict all events coming up and all surprises of 
life. People may lose their jobs, a spouse may get sick, children may have 
social or psychological problems, etc.
Th e minority opinion of Justice L’Heureux Dubé in the quoted 
Canadian decision, is again illuminating:
‘Th e marital relationship changes over time. Houses and other assets are bought 
and sold, one of the partners is promoted or loses their job, children are born, 
accidents occur, or a member of the family becomes ill. Th ese and other events 
Gender Inequalities and Family Solidarity in Times of Crisis
Intersentia 77
are rarely anticipated at the outset and appropriately bargained for. Further, 
neither spouse can anticipate who will contribute what to the marriage. As a 
consequence, even the most intelligent of adults lack the capacity to evaluate the 
commitments involved in any agreement dealing with the consequences of a 
dissolution that will only come aft er great change occurs in the relationship.’76
Fully informed consent to agree with a contract of strict separation of 
property requires information.77
First of all, the information must be complete and comprise the full 
picture of the legal rules, including the alternatives. A common reason for 
spouses under Belgian law to opt for a separation of property is the overkill 
creditor protection of the community regime in case of professional debts.78 
Off ering the strict separation of property as the solution for this creditor 
risk is not giving full information.79 Th e full picture includes explaining 
that one indeed needs a contract of separation of property to counter that 
risk, yet not a contract of strict separation. One can perfectly mitigate the 
creditor risk with a contract of separation with a 50/50 participation clause 
in the marital gains.
Secondly, the information should not merely be about the legal rules 
but also explain the very concrete consequences and possible risks of these 
rules in diff erent scenarios. Th erefore it is vital to ask the wife whether she 
understands that such contract and its principles of autonomy may result 
in a scenario where she is depending on maintenance upon divorce aft er 
twenty years. So the story goes:80
‘A woman, a successful lawyer, quits her job and the junior partner track in 
her law fi rm, only aft er three years of marriage because of the work with their 
two children. She would work part-time in a notary’s offi  ce, earning about ten 
times less. All her time would be devoted to raising the children, organising the 
household and supporting her husband. He would need that, being an intern 
at the local hospital with the ambition of becoming head of department. Many 
evenings of listening to him, reassuring and helping him, hosting dinners for 
the hospital’s Board of Directors. Feeling independent, she would be using her 
small salary to pay the groceries and the kids’ stuff . Th e house in Brussels and 
later the house at the beach in Knokke would be bought with the husband’s 
management company. All would go rather well for a couple of years, however 
she would not be able to continue working at the notary’s offi  ce because of the 
youngest son’s learning disorder. He would need all the help and assistance of 
his mother. But she would be happy, knowing that she and her husband would 
be in it together, for better and for worse. And then she would be so surprised, 
aft er twenty years, to learn that her husband needed some space, and that a new 
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young and beautiful doctor of 27 at the hospital was helpful in giving him some 
extra oxygen. And then he would ask her to live by the rules of their contract 
of autonomy and independence, and apply the title principle. Th e house and 
apartment would be his, also the stock portfolio and the Porsche. Th e VW 
Golf and one small bank account would be hers. And of course he would pay 
maintenance for the children and also for her, for a couple of years until she 
fi nds a new job.’
If the wife receives this kind of full and realistic information, chances are 
high that she will not make the choice for the strict separation of property.
Th is is why we need to stimulate much more open communication and 
negotiation before the marriage about the possible matrimonial contracts.81 
Such negotiation may and should empower the weaker party, oft en the 
woman, helping her to discover and assert her own legitimate interests. 
She must overcome the romantic idea that, although he insists on strict 
separation of property, he means so well.
And even if the weaker party does agree with the strict separation of 
property, the question remains whether it has been a free and autonomous 
choice, as explained above concerning the choice to marry or not. It also 
takes two to agree to a marital contract.
3.1.2.2. Not words but behaviour and actions count from the point of no 
return
Th e fundamental idea of freedom to act but being held responsible for those 
acts also counts in the context of matrimonial contracts of strict and pure 
separation of property. How can a civilised society accept to only look 
at the words of twenty years ago? Here too, the reasoning should be that 
both spouses thought and assumed they would organise their partnership 
in full equality, autonomy and independence and therefore opted for these 
words. However over the years they may have shaped their joint venture in 
a totally diff erent way with a role and task division that became much more 
complicated than ever assumed and oft en with a huge contribution of one 
of the partners, mostly the wife, to the household and the children. Th ereby, 
she is sacrifi cing, at least partially, her own earning capacity and career 
potential. Th e couple’s behaviour and actions in that case have overruled 
the words of the contract. Although they agreed to A in words, the choices 
they have made over the years through their actions were for B, and it is to B 
they should be held. As long as both spouses have contributed equally to the 
partnership, in all kinds of relevant ways, they should share equally in the 
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marital gains or partnership assets. Why would one contribution, working 
on the labour market, be exclusively decisive? Th erefore, also for married 
couples who have chosen for strict separation of property, there should be 
a point of no return where contractual autonomy is replaced by a protective 
format of imperative rules with a focus on solidarity.
4. CONCLUSION
A discrepancy exists between the ideal image of an emancipated and 
individualised society where each individual is fi nancially independent, on 
the one hand, and the socio-economic reality on the other. Even if complete 
fi nancial dependence between spouses is no longer the starting point 
when living together, a certain level of income dependency remains. Upon 
entry into a relationship, whether or not within a marriage, an economic 
unit is created which leads to dependency between the partners caused by 
the division of tasks and income within the couple. Women in particular 
remain dependent on a degree of ‘income sharing’ in a relationship, because 
they – more oft en than men – work part-time, make use of the system 
of career breaks or continue to work full-time but curtail their career 
prospects and choose a so-called nine-to-fi ve job so that they can take on 
caring tasks. Th is division of activities and choices within a relationship still 
leads to inequalities between men and women in the labour market as well 
as in their respective earning capacities. As a result, divorce or relationship 
break up continue to go hand in hand with a loss of prosperity and higher 
risk of poverty, especially for women.
Th e legal protection of a partner upon the dissolution of a relationship 
seems to be insuffi  ciently attuned to today’s society. Due to the economic 
crisis, public funds to cover this risk are scarce. We advocate that a shift  
from public to private law protection is needed.
In most western legal systems, family policy and family law legislators 
have, with some success, focused on realising the ideals of freedom and 
equality. In contrast, the ideal of fraternity has been neglected. Th e role 
of solidarity in provisions relating to co-habitation has been eroded. Yet a 
balance between these three revolutionary ideals is essential. Th e neglect of 
one of the three principles (in this case fraternity or solidarity) will in the 
longer term be detrimental to the other two (that is equality and freedom). 
Th e legislator too oft en assumes the economic self-reliance and equality of 
the partners, and pays too little attention to the fi nancial consequences of 
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the breakdown of a relationship. It is remarkable how little importance the 
legislator attaches to the economic impact that co-habitation, and marriage 
in particular, has on some people, primarily women and children.
Moreover, we must emphasise the advantages that the government gets 
from promoting and supporting relationships, such as marriage, at times 
of economic crisis. A relationship between partners is the ‘cheapest’ and 
most effi  cient way to guarantee the livelihood of an individual, namely 
by placing the responsibility for that economic security with another 
individual, the partner. In a partnership the social and other risks that may 
befall an individual are dealt with communally. Given the fi nancial limits of 
the social security system and the welfare state, the benefi t of such private 
partnerships should not be underestimated. At the peak of the welfare state, 
a reduction of family solidarity was forecasted, but we must now realise, at a 
time of ever-increasing economic and fi nancial diffi  culties, that the opposite 
is true. Th e family must be once again held responsible for guaranteeing the 
livelihood of the individual. Family law needs to shape this solidarity and 
make it a reality.
In this chapter some suggestions have been made to come to a more 
solidarity-based and fair family law, that takes the existing gender 
inequalities as its starting point and strives to compensate for the pernicious 
fi nancial consequences that these inequalities lead to. We had a particular 
focus on the precarious situation of unmarried cohabitants and spouses 
married under separation of property.
First, the necessity of more open communication and transparent and 
informed negotiation about the consequences of the choice to marry or 
not, and under which regime, was emphasised. Such negotiation should 
empower the weaker party, oft en the woman, helping her to discover and 
assert her own legitimate interests.
Secondly, the idea of freedom to act yet being held responsible for 
those acts was promoted. On each relationship with a certain degree of 
interdependence, a protective format with a focus on solidarity should 
be applied. From the so-called ‘point of no return’, the autonomy of will 
and the freedom of choice of the partners not to be in a relationship 
characterised by solidarity could be overruled by imperative corrections 
to protect the weakest party. Criteria to defi ne the point of no return can 
be: three years of living together, or having a child together, or the fact 
that a substantial contribution is made by one or by both partners to the 
relationship or in the sole interest of the other partner. An example of 
such an imperative correction to the autonomy of will and the freedom of 
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choice is the equal division of the marital gains or partnership assets when 
both spouses have contributed equally to the partnership in any relevant 
way.
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